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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-\'S. -
GERALD OAKLEY HUGGINS, 
Defendant wnd Avpellant. 
Case 
No.10545 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE~IENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Gerald Oakley Huggins, was convicted 
in the Second .Judicial District Court of Weber County, 
State of Utah, of Yiolation of Section 76-7-9, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, alleging that he did wilfully and un-
lawfull~, take indecent liberties with the persons of two 
female children, age six and seven years, without in-
tending or attempting to commit the crime of rape upon 
said children. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon the trial of the aforesaid case, the defendant 
was com·icted hy jury trial and sentenced by the court to 
Rene an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant respectfully requests that the . 
• · COll\'l(•. 
ti on be set aside and the said defendant dis char d. . . ge , 01 
m the alternative a new trial be granted. 
STATEMENT OF F AC'l1S 
The evidence indicated that the def end ant. Gerald 
Oakley Huggins, is a married man who on the date 01 
the alleged offense resided with his wife and a srnalt 
daughter, in Ogden City, Utah. 
The alleged victims in this matter resided with thei1 
pa.rents next door to the home of the defendant (R. 15). 
The testimony of the mother indicated that while 
giving her daughters a bath on the 10th day of .July, 1965, 
she noticed a redness in the area of the sexual parts or 
the girls and questioned them concerning it (R. 20). Thal 
the girls then informed her that the defendant ha<l taken 
them into the bedroom of his home a short time prior to 
the 10th of July, 1965, and had placed his hands ou their 
sexual parts (R. 37). 
There was also testimony by the mother that an older 
brother of the girls, Mike, age 13, had molested the girls 
in the past and that the mother had told the girls that if 
he did this a.gain he would have to go away and live 
elsewhere (R. 23, 26). 
On page 36 of the transcript the mother of the chi!· 
b · t' to relatr dren was allowed by the Court, over o Jee ion, 
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;i portion of conversation with the alleged victims in 
which the mother testified a third girl, Garthia Walton, 
,1ge 10 years, is alleged to have told the little girls in-
i.·olved here, that the defendant had molested her as well 
(R 36). The Court, in denying the defendant's Motion 
for \fistrial, was informed by the District Attorney, that 
the charge of indecent liberties, involving the Walton 
cirl, hacl been filed the morning of the trial (R. 40). Not-
·virhstanding the fact that the evidence is clear that the 
~tate knew all about the alleged offense involving the 
IO-Year old Walton girl from the very inception of the 
investig-a tions of this case. 
The little girls then testified that the defendant had 
molested them, and Garthia Walton was sworn and, over 
objection, testified that the defendant had molested her 
in substantially the same manner as the two small girls 
who \,-ere the subject of this prosecution. 
The defendant then took the stand and denied any 
kiiowledge of the incident whatsoever. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
IN ALLOWING THE PROSECUTION TO 
OFFER EVIDENCE OF THE COMMISSION 
OF OTHER CRIMES BY THE DEFENDANT. 
The problem of when and under what circumstances 
the prosecution will be allowed to introduce evidence of 
other criminal acts is one that has received a great deal 
3 
of attention from the courts. The general rule 1•8 t f se ortL , 
in 22A, C.J.S. at Section 682 as follows: ·· 
' 'The general rule is that evidence that a«' , 
h "tt d th · · use" as commi e. ano er cnme mdependent, and un 
~~nected, with the one on trial is inadmissible: , 
it is not competent to prove one crime by pi· 
• O\. 
mg another." 
In discussing the various reasons for the rule it 113, 
pointed out that in many incidences evidence of an llii 
connected crime would tend to influence the jur1 
adversely, and that said influencing of the jury woulri 
usually outweigh any probative worth that the evidene1• 
may have. It was also pointed out that a defendant i, 
entitled to be tried upon one case at a time and that to 
force him to defend, in effect, several allegations of 
criminal conduct at once was placing an unfair burden 
upon the defendant. 
It is true there are many exceptions to the general 
rule stated above, notwithstanding the existence of these 
various exceptions, the general rule denying admissio11 
of evidence of other offenses should be strictly enforced 
in all cases where applicable, because of the prejudice 
and injustice of such evidence, and should not be departed 
from except under conditions which clearly justify such 
a departure. This rule is set forth in numerous cases as 
exemplified by the following: People v. Epping, 162 N~E. 
2d 366, 17 Ill., 2d 337 (1959) ; State v. Frizell, 295 P. 6JS, 
132 Kan. 261, (1931); State v. Eder, 78 P. N23, 36 Wash. 
42, (1904). 
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In the cas of State v. Lyle, 118 S.E. 803, 125 S.C. 406, 
!1 923), the Court stated as follows: 
"EYidence of another offense coming within one 
of the exceptions 'is yet inadmissible, unless it 
mav be considered reasonably necessary in the 
light of a.11 the facts of the particular case to 
accomplish the purpose for which it is offered.' " 
In the recent case of State v. Kazda, 38 P. 2d 407, 14 
Ptah 2d 266, (1963), the Court reversed and remanded 
for a new trial. A case wherein a defendant was exam-
ined hy the prosecutor concerning a conversation that he 
had with an FBI agent that related to other offenses not 
connected with the one upon which he was being tried. 
The Court in reversing stated as follows : 
"We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial 
error. It implied that the defendant was implicat-
ed in other crimes, none of them proven, and could 
have no other effect than to de·grade the defend-
ant and to give to the jury the impression that 
he had a propensity for crime.'' 
Again, our 0"-"11 Supreme Court in the case of State 
'·Dickson, 361 P. 2d 412, 12 Utah 2d 8 (1961), in revers-
ing- and remanding for a new trial a case involving the 
questioning of a defendant concerning a prior alleged 
nffense of robbery, the Court stated with approval the 
i;eneral rule as follows: 
"The universally accepted general rule is that 
such evidence is not admissible if its effect is 
merely to disgrace the defendant or show his pro-
pensity to commit crime. However, where evi-
denee has a special relevancy to prove the crime 
of "'hi ch the defendant stands charge, it may be 
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allowed for that purposr; and the fa t th . 
h } . . c at r s ows anot 1er cnme wdl not render tlw "d ' 
inadmissible.'' ri 1 enri 
The Court further ""<'llt on to stat<' in the Stat, , 
Dickson: 
'.'It is a soun<l and salntory policy of thE· la\\' L 
mdnlge e\·<'ryone, inrlnding rom·ietPd frlon~. id!: 
the presumption of inno<'enre, and to rrriuirr tJ, 
State to obtain and pr<'srnt snffi<·ie11t C'rnlihle 
dence to co1ffince the .inry of tht• dt>fPnd:rnt', ~ru 11 
of the crime chaq:~ed lw~·ond a rea;;nnahl1· dni:i, 
If this wen• not so, sc>rions and perhap!' ir:Hp'" 
able ohstacles to reformation an<l rehaliilitatin!. 
would exist for a man who had oner acquired a ha1i 
reputation.'' 
In the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Stat, , 
Winget, :no P. 2d 738, 6 Utah 2d 243, (19±7) the rourt wa' 
faced with a similar type situation as the instant case. 11 1 
this case a defendant was charged with the rrime of rapP. 
The girl involved was eight years of agr. At the trial !ht 
Court, o\·er the ohjections of eounsel, allowed a 1i-WHI" 
old step-daughter to testify that some years earlier th1· 
defendant had rapPd her while she> residrd in his hom1 
The Court stated the question as follows: 
"The sole question confronting us is wheth1°r thl' 
c>videnee of similar sex arts with persons otl~rr 
than the eomplaining witness is admissahle. 111· 
less we were inclined to revc>rs<' our own <lec1s11111 
in the strikingly similar <'ase of State Y. Willi~m,. 
36 Utah, 273, 103 P. 2;,o, whirh we feel romt.rarn
1
e.d 
. 1 . . d . "ble rn t 11~ not to do, snrh en( ence is ma m1ss1 
state." 
In a concurring opinion in the Winget Case, the Hon. 
Wacle, .Justice, reviewed the prior cases of the Utah court 
;i!ld summarized the rnles as follows: 
'·The following is a brief review of the rules 
a hon ref erred to: Except where otherwise pro-
\·ir1<·d ],,. ru]('s of evidence all relevant evidence is 
;1dmissi\)Je. RPle,·ant e,·idence means evidence hav-
1rg- a tern le11ey in reason to prove or disprove any 
makrial facts in issue. However, evidence that 
n perc;on ('Ommitted a crime upon one oceasion is 
::rndmissible to pro,·e his disposition, bad char-
Jdc·r. or propensity to commit erime as the basis 
for a11 infrrenee that he committed the crime for 
1d1ich he is on trial, but such evidence when rele-
,·ant is admissible to prove some other material 
ia('t i1)('lucling the absence of mistake or accident, 
motin. opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
kuo\\·Jeclgr or identit!·· The reason for excluding 
:-::uC'l1 (•,·idl'llC't> is that the danger of prejudice out-
wei!,d1s the probatin~ ,·alue of such evidence. This 
is said to he an application of the rule against the 
initial introduction of evidence of bad character by 
the pros("('uti1m. Howe,·er, it is generally recog-
nized that the .Judge mav in his discretion exclude 
such e,·idenee if Ii«' find~ that its probative value 
is '>nhstm1tia1ly outw<:'ighed hy the risk that the 
a1tmission will ca nse undue consumption of time, 
nrate substantial danger of undue prejudice, or 
i)f confusing the issues, or misleading the jury or 
nnfairlv and harmfully surprise the defendant 
''·ho has not had n'asona hle opportunitv to an-
ticipate that such e\·idence woul<l be offe~ed. 
"Iu appl,'l·i11g these rulrs to the facts of this casl' 
it i« rl<'ar that the 0\·idenre of preYious sexual 
relatiOJ1c; hetween thl' defl:'ndant and his stl'p-
daug-hter has prohati,·e ,·alue to show the dl'-
g-nuled eharaeh•r, <lisposition and propensity to 
'.'<1mmit ~<·xnal <·rimP and in particular tlw crime 
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there charged. If that is the only maten· 1 f 
· th· h. h h · a a~t m . is case w ic sue evidence tends to p .. . . ad . .bl b ro,e tt is m m1ss1 e ecause of the exclusion are 
ception to the general rule that all relevant e~. 
dence is admissible, to the effect that eviden e\1,·. 
another criID:e is i~dmissible if it only show:~~d 
ch.aracter, disposition o~ pr?pensity to commit 
crime generally or the crime m particular." 
Most of the Utah cases as well as most cases from 
other jurisdictions involving the question herein. 31., 
cases in which the defendant was cross-examined concen: 
ing his prior acts of alleged misconduct. In the instan· 
case the State of Utah was asked by the Court at the out 
set of the trial to indicate who its witnesses would b~ 
The Sate did not list the name of Garthia Walton as a 
prospective witness (R. 41). The first indication that her 
name was involved in any manner oe.curred during th(· 
examination of the mother of the children (R. 36). Tlw 
additional fact that the State of Utah, although it harl 
taken the statement of Garthia Walton at the same timP 
tha.t it had taken the statements of the Nelson girls. in 
1 
July, of 1965 (R. 105). The State, by the District Attor-
ney, asked the mother of Garthia Walton to sign a Com· 
plaint charging the defendant with a similar crime on the 
very morning that the instant case came to trial (R.1061 
The defendant feels that it is significant the timing of th' 
State as to when it decided to prosecute the defendant 
on the Walton case. That the timing of the prosecution. 
the failure of the State to divulge Garthia Walton, and 
the manner in which her testimony was elicited clear!: ' 
St t t show hail indicate an intent on the part of the a e 0 
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character on the part of the defendant and a propensity 
10 commit this type of crime. 
In connection with the allowing of testimony of a 
,;milar act of misconduct with a separate person, the 
Court made the following statement to the jury (R. 81) : 
THE CouRT : Are you going to call the Walton 
girl! 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Yes, your Honor, I intend to 
eall the Walton girl. 
THE CouRT: The jury is instructed as follows. It 
is my belief that the State claims that they will 
present another witness, a. little Walton girl, they 
say that will allege some misconduct towards her 
by this defendant of a similar to that to which he 
is here charged with. You are instructed that he 
is not here on trial for assault upon the Walton 
girl. There is another charge, I believe, filed re-
g-arding the Walton girl. 
~fa. BINGHAM:: Your Honor, I will object to this 
on the part of the Court and ask a.t this time 
for a mistrial. 
THE CouRT : Whether there is or isn't, I don't 
know, but that is not the trial that is taking place 
today. The trial today involves, alleges as to the 
two Nelson girls only, so you cannot consider the 
Walton girl's testimony as proof of this offense. 
You can receive it for a bearing, if any it has on 
the question of motive of any person who com-
mits this type of offense here on trial, if you be-
lieve this offense is the type of offense that would 
be committed by only the smallest minority of 
the population because it is of an unusual nature. 
In other words something that only an unusual 
person would be motivated to do. You cannot 
convict of these offenses because vou think he may 
•' . 
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have committed another offense. On the· _ 
t
. . issue 01 
mo ivahon and make-up of a person who ul 
commit the type of offense charged here i7°~ 0 
find it to be a highly different type of thing- 1f~~ 
that purpose only you can hear the Walton i(irl 
All right. -
It is the contention of the defendant that the Cot::·t 
at this point instructed the jury that the Walton g-irt', 
testimony was to be utilized by them for two purposh 
First, they were to listen to the Walton girl's testimom 
of a similar occurrence and determine, with its 3[1L 
whether or not the child molesting was an unusual typ1 
of occurrence and an occurrence that onlv a minoritl of . ' -
persons would commit. Secondly, instruction by tht 
Court told the jury they could consider the Walton girl' 
testimony as an aid in determining motivation. 
It is the contention of the def end ant that thiR ir. 
struction by the Court was in effect an instruction thal 
the jury was to use the evidence of the Walton girl to , 
determine if the defendant is or was a person of a 1Jr.. 
praved nature. 
There is no allegation that the Walton girl's lf''ti-
monv was to aid in establishing the absence of mistake or • 
accident, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, kno\1':-
edge or identity. It could not be contended by the·S·t~t~ 
that the evidence was offered to impeach the credibiht' 
. k th t d at thi~ of this defendant, he had not ta en e s an 
time. The attempt by the Sate to show an unrelateJ: 
d d ·fr not ltst1
11 
prior act, between the def en ant an a pa1 . . 
. f d t tl e uecr,s1tY 
in the Complarnt, forced upon the de en an 1 
10 
of attempting to defend himself in connection with accu-
sations involving three children. Needless to say he had 
no opportunity to have a Preliminary Hearing on the 
Walton girl charge, prior to being forced to defend him-
sdf in connection therewith. 
CONCLUSION 
In conrlusion the Court committed error in allowing 
il12 evidence of the Walton girl to be submitted to the jury 
",;d in the instruction of the Court to the jury in con-
L\>ction therewith. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. G. BINGHAM 
1001 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorney for Appella;n.t 
11 
